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Professor Dinh raises the right issue highlighted by the 9/11
Commission: what should be the post-Cold War organizing principle for
the global order?' Historians may well consider the period between 1989
and 2001 a confused interim, in which it was unclear what would replace
the bipolar world. While I agree with Professor Dinh that we now face an
altered international landscape rife with transnational problems, the most
pressing of which is terrorism, I disagree with his proposition that the
solution lies in bolstering patriotism and returning to the primacy of the
nation-state. Rather, I contend that these problems beseech us to create
additional layers of governance whose jurisdiction will equal the scope of
the unmistakably global problems that challenge us. Therefore, I will first
outline the basic contours of these new layers of global governance on a
practical level. It is then crucial to move to a normative level, within which
I will point to the seeds of an emerging global synthesis of values between
the East and the West.
Global governance is possible only ifthere exists a sense of community
based on shared values. Therefore, though I agree with Professor Dinh's
diagnosis of the problems, I believe his solution falls far short of what is
required if we are truly to end the assault on the safety and moral culture
of all the world's peoples.
I. THE NEED FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Professor Dinh is correct in arguing that global terrorism poses a threat
to what I call the Old System (national governments and intergovernmental
organizations). Thus far, the Old System has had a difficult time coping
with global terrorism.2 In this sense, terrorism is but one of a whole slew
of swelling transnational problems that require new systems to handle them
effectively. These problems include environmental threats (e.g., the rain of
radio-activity on neighboring states during a nuclear meltdown in Russia),
* Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor at The George Washington University and
Director of the Communitarian Network.
1. See Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REv. 867 (2004).
2. See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, FROM EMPIRE TO COMMUNITY: A NEW APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2004).
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transitional organized crime, epidemics (e.g., SARS), illegal trafficking in
people (especially women), and many others. On its face the Old System
has been unable to cope with these transnational problems. The main
reason is that recent developments in communication, travel, and trade
make national borders ever more porous. As we are now learning, even
new police powers, of the kinds included in the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Interpret and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001 and other such
measures, are unable to defend against transnational problems.
Intergovernmental organizations aim to deal with these transnational
problems, but these organizations are cumbersome. Typically, the large
number of national representatives involved are instructed in detail by their
governments as to the positions they are supposed to take, and they must
consult with their governments if they seek to introduce significant
changes to those positions.4 Hence, the volume and import of what they
can accomplish is often highly limited.
I cannot see how a return to nation-states would alleviate this situation,
nor is this where historical trends are moving us. We are instead headed
toward the creation of another level of governance, above and beyond the
nation-state-not replacing it but augmenting it. Call that layer
"supranational governance." Supranational governance is most advanced
and developed in the European Union, where more and more decisions and
policies are formed and implemented by "Brussels," a code word used to
refer to the European Commission,5 an executive branch of the new form
of European governance. 6 The Commissioners are not accountable to
national governments, although they are accountable to the European
Parliament, which has the power to dismiss them by adopting a motion of
censure.7 Other supranational elements can be found in the International
Criminal Court, World Trade Organization, and Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers. Further, the World Health Organization,
after the breakout of SARS, acquired some supranational features to the
extent that it related directly to medical authorities in various countries

3. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
4. For example, most representatives to the World Trade Organization (WTO) are entirely
accountable to their home governments. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
MISSION OF THE USTR, at http://www.ustr.gov/whoWeAre/Mission-of theUSTR.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2004).
5. European Union, Eurojargon. at http://europa.eu.int/abc/eurojargonlindex-en.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2004).
6. European Union, The European Union at a Glance, at http://europaeu.int/abc/
indexen.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
7. European Union, European Union Institutions and Other Bodies: The European
Commission, at http://europa.eu.intlinstitutionscomn/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
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without going through their governments.8 None of these examples are
without serious defects, but all of them show that we are increasingly
experimenting not only with a new layer of governance, but also with the
issues of accountability and oversight that such bodies require. Ergo, we
are facing questions concerning how to establish the legitimacy of
supranational organizations, an issue to which I will return below.
Global governance has been criticized for many reasons, some ofwhich
are more compelling than others. For instance, it is said that such
governance violates old-fashioned notions of national sovereignty,9 which
Professor Dinh defines well. However, the notion of national sovereignty
is neither God-given nor part of human nature. Instead, as Professor Dinh
correctly points out, global governance was something concocted in the
seventeenth century to stop religious wars, which entailed the intervention
of one ruler in the internal affairs ofother communities.'l For decades now,
champions of human rights have legitimated the idea that the international
community has the power to deal with the abuse of citizens by their own
nation. Humanitarian interventions in Haiti, East Timor, Kosovo, and
elsewhere add to the legitimacy of this supranational approach." Indeed,
when the global community did not interfere in Rwanda and in Sudan, its
inaction came under much criticism." Further, many believe that nuclear
proliferation ought to be stopped, even if the method used to stop
proliferation does not fully respect old-fashioned notions of national
sovereignty. Such flawed, old-fashioned notions as national sovereignty
can never be sufficiently "reconstructed to fit the policy or political needs
of the day," as Professor Dinh hopes.' 3 Rather, we need a whole new, more
global, approach. Stopping terrorism is but part of this trend.
More on the mark, however, is the criticism that any use of force across
national borders should be subjected to some kind of oversight and
8. World Health Organization, The Operational Response to SARS, at
http://www.who.int/csr/sarsgoarn2003_4_l6/en/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
9. See generallyAndrewT. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'LL.J.
303 (2004) (discussing the World Trade Organization's role in global governance); Herbert V.
Morais, The Questfor InternationalStandards: Global Governance vs. Sovereignty, 50 U. KAN.
L. REV. 779 (2002) (exploring the extent to which the development of new international standards
challenges national sovereignty).
10. See Dinh, supranote 1, at 870-71.
11. See Kenneth Roth, Setting the Standard,26 HARV. INT'L REV. 58 (2004).
12. See Comment, Leading Article: The Belated Recognition of Reality in Sudan,
INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 10, 2004, at 36; Anne Penketh,At Last: Colin Powell Uses the Word
the World's Human Rights Bodies Have Been Demanding as US Toughens Its Stance on the
Slaughterin Sudan: GENOCIDE,INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 10, 2004, at 1; Warren P. Strobel
& Sudarsan Raghavan, Violence in Sudan Is Genocide, Powell Says: Grave Term Could Boost
World Response to Crisis,CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 10, 2004, at 15A; Editorial, West Should
Heed US. Call on Sudan, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 10, 2004, at A16.
13. Dinh, supra note I, at 873.
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accountability, rather than unilaterally undertaken by one power." The
result is wide support for the United Nations, which is, despite its flaws,
the only body that can give a voice to the people of the world.
Consequently, the main charge against the United States was not that it
interfered in the internal affairs of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, but that it did
not wait for the United Nations to approve such an intervention.' 5 Whether
the much-reformed United Nations (or, say, a Council of Democracies or
some other body) should be the arbiter of transnational legitimacy is a
matter for much deliberation. Nevertheless, it is evident that in order to
deal with rising transnational problems, it is impractical for countries either
to rely merely on the Old System or to act in the longer run as illegitimate
imperial powers.
It is important to note that much has been made in recent years not only
about the need for oversight, but also about the need for global legitimacy
when acting across national borders. 6 In this context, the powers that be
often use "soft power,"' 7 which in turn needs the backing of hard power,
although this need is sometimes ignored.
In addition to acting as an oversight body, the United Nations often acts
as a key legitimator for the use of soft power. Currently, it does not
command the hard power required to back up its resolutions and
declarations." Thus, until the formation of a global security authority,
supranational layers of governance depend on nation-states to enforce
decisions. Had the United States (in Haiti, Somalia, and Liberia), France
(in the Ivory Coast), Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) (in Kosovo), or Australia (in East Timor) not provided the
muscle, United Nations resolutions would have been of little consequence.
For example, in August 2003, when the United States did not provide
adequate security for the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad (perhaps
because the United Nations staff did not feel that they needed such
protection), the damage and loss of life resulting from a terrorist attack
forced the United Nations to greatly scale back its operations in Iraq. 9

14. See, e.g., Charlotte Ku, When Can Nations Go to War? Politicsand Change in the UN
Security System, 24 MICH. J.INT'L L. 1077 (2003) (exploring the evolving international security
framework and evaluating the United Nations as a forum for change).
15. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Clear,CruelLessons oflraq, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr.
8, 2004, at 19.
16. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the United States' invasion of Iraq "was both illegal and
illegitimate").
17. To use "soft power" is to act in a legitimate manner, in line with international law and
norms and international institutions, particularly the United Nations. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 4549.
18. Phillip Coorey, UN Threatens Retreatfrom Iraq-butBush Demands More, Not Less,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Sept. 24, 2003, World section, at 31.
19. UN-Tribute, PREss TRUST OF INDIA, Aug. 27, 2003, Nationwide International News
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Often in the past the United Nations did not act until a national power
was willing to commit, or had already committed, its forces to a cause.
Those who confuse the ought-to-be United Nations with the as-is United
Nations tend to ignore this unpleasant truth. Thus, despite United Nations
resolutions dating back to 1975, East Timor was ravaged by Indonesia until
1999, when Australia decided to support the right of the East Timorese to
self-determination by beginning to exert the necessary pressure and force
to change the situation.20 With Australia providing leadership,
infrastructure, and troops, the United Nations finally was able to address
East Timor's humanitarian crisis. 2' In 2000, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone captured
United Nations peacekeepers who had been stationed there to stop the civil
war.22 To free the peacekeepers, who are its citizens, the United Kingdom
sent troops, who stayed in the country in order to secure the capital and
restore some semblance of order.23 The British then sponsored a United
Nations resolution to ban the sales of diamonds from Sierra Leone, as the
revenues from those sales were believed to be fueling the war.24 Just as
British involvement was crucial to restoring order and to augmenting the
United Nations peacekeeping mission, United Nations resolutions were of
little consequence when Iraq overran Kuwait until the United States and
Russia acted in unison to combat the aggression.25 Conversely, when no
power came forward in Rwanda, the United Nations was useless.26 Thus,
it is not enough to assert the need for supranational governing institutions;
there must also be hard power available to enforce rules and decisions. For
now, such power is provided by nation-states. But in the future,
enforcement will be far more effective if pursued on a more global, and
hence more cooperative, level.
The formation ofglobal governance does notjust hinge on international
institutions like the United Nations. The global war against terrorism has
prompted the creation of an American-led antiterrorism coalition. 7 Fifty

section.
20. See Nicholas J. Wheeler & Tim Dunne, East Timor and the New Humanitarian
Interventionism, 77 INT'L AFF. 805-06 (2001).
21. Id.at 806.
22. Douglas Farah, SierraLeone Gets Pledge of BritishAid: Official Says Ships Will Stay
After Most Troops Leave, WASH. POST, June 9, 2000, at A28.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. LAWRENCEFREEDMAN&EFRAIMKARSH,THEGuLFCONFLICT 1990-1991, atxxix (1993).
26. See Christiane Amanpour,Amanpour: LookingBackatRwandaGenocide (Apr. 6,2004),
at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/O4/O6/rwanda.amanpourl.
27. Alan Sipress, 55 Nations Endorse Measures to Fight Terrorism, WASH. POST, Dec. 5,
2001, at A14; Bob Woodward, 50 Countries Detain 360 Suspects at CIA's Behest: Roundup
ReflectsAggressive Efforts ofanIntelligenceCoalition Viewed as Key to War on Terrorism,WASH.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 5 [2004], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

nations, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, often working closely
with the American Central Intelligence Agency, have arrested suspected
terrorists at the behest of the United States.2 Turkey has supplied troops
for the fight against the Taliban, and Indonesia also has offered to
contribute troops. 9 Pakistan, once a major source of support for the
Taliban, has provided significant assistance to the coalition, including
handing over Yassir al-Jaziri, an aide to Osama bin Laden, to the United
States for questioning. 30 Further, NATO agreed to act outside ofEurope for
the first time in its fifty years of existence, 31 and the United Nations
legitimated the war against terrorism through two resolutions it passed in
support of the need to combat terrorist threats.32
Members of the global antiterrorism coalition also have made several
significant and especially rapid and synchronized changes to domestic laws
and policies in their own countries. These measures concern the balance
between social order (specifically public safety and health, such as
protection from bioterrorism) and autonomy (individual rights). For
example, the European Union introduced a community-wide arrest
warrant,33 Germany tightened its security and immigration laws,34 Britain
expanded its antiterrorism act,35 Japan passed new legislation that allows
its Self-Defense Forces to assist the United States,36 France adopted a law
that provides the police with greater search powers, 37 and the Indian
government passed an ordinance that granted the police sweeping new

POST, Nov. 22, 2001, at Al.
28. Woodward, supra note 27, at Al.
29. Harry Sterling, Turkey Takes Riskin JoiningAllies,GAZETrE (Montreal), Nov. 17,200 1,
at B7; Patrick E. Tyler, A Nation Challenged: The Big Picture: Rebels in Control in Kabul as
Taliban Troops Retreat: Bin Laden Hunt Intensifies, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 2001, at Al.
30. Steve Levine, Al Qaeda Communications Operative Is Arrested in EasternPakistan,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at A13.
31. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO's Contributionto the FightAgainst Terrorism,
at http://www.nato.int/terrorisml (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).

32. Jonathan Steele,Attack on Afghanistan: The Law: Right to Self-Defence BasisofAttacks:
Raids Justified by UN Resolutions, US Says, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 9, 2001, at 12.
33. Justice and Home Affairs Council: Member States Agree Thirty Crimesfor EU Arrest

Warrant, EuR. REP., Nov. 17, 2001, available at LEXIS, Europe Information Service; Alison
O'Connor, Leaders Expected to Agree on EuropeanArrest Warrant,IRISH TIMES, Dec. 14, 200 1,
at8.
34. Bertrand Benoit & Margaret Heckel, Berlin Dealon Security Measures Counter-Terror,
FIN. TuMEs (London), Oct. 29, 2001, at 7; Steven Erlanger, German Cabinet Supports New
Immigration Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at A12.
35. Paul Waugh, CampaignAgainst Terrorism: TerrorSuspects to be Rounded up Under

New Law, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 15, 2001, at 14.
36. Editorial, JapanNeed Not Be in a Hurry to Show Its Will to Send SDF,ASAH SHIMBUN,
Oct. 31, 2001, availableat LEXIS, Asahi News Service.
37. Peter Ford, European Nations Broaden Police Powers, CHRISTIAN Scl. MONITOR
(Boston), Nov. 15, 2001, at 8.
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powers."8 These changes, which have occurred in a fairly coordinated
fashion in many nations more or less simultaneously, seem to be prompted
by a hierarchical and strongly transnational anti-terrorism police
department, governed by the United States in coalition with its allies. This
governing. mechanism is unlike a typical United Nations body or even
NATO, and it differs from other empires in that it has a narrow scope,
seeks not so much to control territory as to control action, and truly is
global in reach. The transnational anti-terrorism movement is another sign
of the trend towards global governance.
II. THE

EMERGING GLOBAL SYNTHESIS

Out of discordant, often strident, voices that emanate from the East and
the West, a new composition is slowly arising. The blended tune has a
limited register. Divergent voices will continue to be heard on many issues
and this new view is sure to be accorded divergent interpretations in
various parts of the world and over time. Yet the new tune suffices to
provide stronger support for global institution building than was available
in recent decades. The metaphorical "voices" I refer to are expressions of
basic normative positions, worldviews, and ideologies. They concern
values that define what is considered legitimate,39 a major foundation of
social order and good government on both the local and global levels.
The position I articulate here greatly diverges from two major themes
that underlie much of the recent foreign policy thinking in the West. Both
themes claim to predict the direction in which the world is moving, as well
as to prescribe the ways it ought to progress. One theme holds that the
world is proceeding (and needs to be encouraged) to embrace several core
values, as well as the institutions that embody them, all of which the West
possesses: individual rights, democratic government, and free markets.
This position has been advanced by Francis Fukuyama, Michael
Mandelbaum, and Fareed Zakaria, among others."' It has also been
embraced by the Bush Administration, whose 2002 strategic document
38. Somini Sengupta, Indian Leader Feels Pressurefrom All Sides over Violence, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002, at A5.
39. Legitimacy, as it is commonly treated in standard sources, is defined as "the foundation
of such governmental power as is exercised both with a consciousness on the government's part that
it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right." 9 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OFTHE SOCIAL SCIENCES 244 (David L. Sills ed., reprint ed. 1972). Robert Jackson
shows that there are recognized international norms that have implications for determining
legitimate conduct by states. See ROBERT JACKSON, THE GLOBAL CoVENANT: HUMAN CONDUCT IN
A WORLD OF STATES 1-25 (2000).
40. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992);
MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE IDEAS THAT CONQUERED THE WORLD: PEACE, DEMOCRACY, AND
FREE MARKETS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2002); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF
FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD (2003).
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states:
The great struggles of the twentieth century between
liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for
the forces of freedom-and a single sustainable model for
national success: freedom, democracy, and free
enterprise.... People everywhere want to be able to speak
freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please;
educate their children-male and female; own property; and
enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are
right and true for every person, in every society ....
Tony Blair, who based his New Labour Party on the themes of
community and responsibility, 42 endorsed these same individualist values
when he addressed the global society. He stated: "'Ours are not Western
values, they are the universal values of the human spirit. And anywhere,
anytime ordinary people are given the chance to choose, the choice is the
same: freedom, not tyranny; democracy, not dictatorship; the rule of law,
not the rule of the secret police."' 43
The other theme holds that the world outside the West is largely
governed by religious fundamentalism or other alien sets of values, which
are incompatible with Western ones; hence, these antithetical civilizations
are bound to clash. Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis are proponents
of this view. 44
Both viewpoints imply that non-Western nations have little to
contribute to the global development ofpolitical and economic institutions
or to the values that they embody.45 Rights, liberty, and capitalism are, after
all, Western contributions to the world. (In Thomas Friedman's succinct
journalistic lingo, the West has the slick, modem Lexus; the East, old and
dusty olive trees.) 46
I beg to differ. The world can and should learn from non-Western
cultures significant lessons concerning international relations, the
development of domestic polities and economies, and the design of new
41. George W. Bush, Introduction to NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL, WHITE HOUSE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
42. See Raymond J. Friel, Blair's Third Way-Thatcher'sEnduring Legacy, 48 U. KAN. L.
REV. 861, 882-94 (2000).
43. George F. Will,... Or Maybe Not at All, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at B7 (quoting
Tony Blair's July 2003 address to Congress).
44. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER (1996); Bernard Lewis, The Roots ofMuslim Rage, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1990, at 47.
45. For a good comparison of Huntington and Fukuyama, see generally Stanley Kurtz, The
Future of "History," POL'Y REV., June & July 2002, at 43.
46. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LExuS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999).
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global architectures. This is especially true in matters concerning respect
for authority, obligations to the common good, and the nurturing of
communal bonds, but only if these values and the relevant institutions are
greatly moderated.
Moreover, the world actually is moving toward a new synthesis
between the West's great respect for individual rights and choices and the
East's respect for social obligations (in rather different ways, of course);
between the West's preoccupation with autonomy and the East's
preoccupation with social order; between Western legal and political
egalitarianism and Eastern authoritarianism; between the West's rejection
of grand ideologies, of utopianism, and the East's extensive normative
characterization of "dos" and "don'ts"; and between Western secularism
and moral relativism and the visions ofthe afterlife and transcendental sets
of meanings found in several Eastern belief systems, including Hinduism,
Confucianism, and select African traditions.47 The synthesizing process
entails modifying the elements that go into it. This synthesis is not a
mechanical combination of Eastern and Western elements, but rather it is
akin to a chemical fusion.
One can, of course, compare various belief systems on many other
scales and come out with different results and groupings. To give but one
example, if we grouped belief systems according to their level of
parsimony or belief in monotheism, several Eastern religions would line
up with the Western ones against some other Eastern ones. However, it is
not my purpose to provide rich typologies or add more intercultural
comparisons. I merely argue that, for several key issues at hand, the
grouping of cultures into East and West suffices as a first approximation.
I shall show that on some points, there are two camps.
Francis Fukuyama advances the thesis that the whole world is in the
process of embracing liberal democratic regimes and capitalism, a process
he famously calls the "end of history."' He recognizes that many nations
are still "in history," but since the collapse of the communist bloc, he sees
a trend toward an increasing and worldwide dominance of individualism.49
Fukuyama's thesis is that the whole world is in the process of embracing
Western values. 5 Non-Western societies were slow to recognize these
individualistic values, but now they are universally discovering them as
compelling." President George W. Bush endorsed this idea, saying, "'The

47. For a comparison of American-style capitalism with that of Asia, see generally JOHN
GRAY, FALSE DAWN 100-32, 166-93 (1998).
48. FUKUYAMA, supra note 40, at 3, 39-51.
49. Id. at 274.
50. Id.at 3.
51. There are some who argue that one can find values within Asian cultural traditions that
are comparable to Western human rights. See, e.g., DANIEL A. BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN
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liberty we prize... is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to
humanity."' 52 This reference is to a global trend of intranational
developments, not to the development of some global society and
government. Thus, China and India are said to be gradually liberalizing and
opening their markets;5 3 the United Nations, the World Health
Organization, and international non-governmental agencies are not held to
undergo such changes.
As I see it, the argument that individualism is gaining -a growing
worldwide following is valid, yet only half right. It is valid because,
despite some setbacks (such as in Latin America), there is considerable and
accumulating evidence that numerous nations gradually are inching-some
even rushing-in the direction of individualism. It is only half true,
however, because the East, despite the fact that it is even more
heterogeneous than the West, brings several key values of its own to the
global dialogue, and it lays moral claims on the West with even greater
assurance of their universal validity than the West does with its claims on
the rest of the world.
The normative positions championed by the East might be called
"authoritarian communitarianism." While the Western position is centered
around the individual, the focus of the Eastern cultures tends to be a
strongly ordered community.54 In its strongest form, the East's core tenets
are not individual rights, but social obligations (toward a very extensive set
of shared common goods and various members of the community); not
liberty, but submission to a higher purpose and authority, whether religious
or secular; not maximization of consumer goods, but service to one or
more gods or to common goods articulated by a secular state.55
In short, both the West and the East contribute to a new normative
synthesis that moves their respective societies, their polities, and, as we
shall see, their economies toward a better design than either individualism
or authoritarian communitarianism provides alone. By bringing their
"surpluses" to the table, elements of each will grow softer as they are
blended with those of the other camp. To use the term "better" immediately
raises the question: What is considered good? The evolving vision of a
good society ultimately has a role to play in narrowing the moral gap, a
major step on the way to the establishment of human primacy. Progress on
this front is best made with values that are shared rather than with those

RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA 50 (2000).

52. President George W. Bush's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State
of the Union, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 109 (Jan. 28, 2003).
53. See Jesse Parker, The Lotus Files: The Emergence of Technology Entrepreneurshipin
China and India, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 2002, at 119.
54. See GRAY, supra note 47, at 166-93.
55. See id.
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that clash or with one side claiming to have a monopoly on what is good.
There cannot be a true community unless all those involved feel that they
are contributing to the shared values. The importance of establishing a
participatory global community, in which all feel that they are represented
and that they have a stake, will become more clear below.
Professor Dinh and others may rightfully point out that the most
challenging aspect of achieving global forms of governance, which in
effect constitute a new layer of sovereignty, is that in the long run such
global governance must compete with national governments for the loyalty
of citizens. For example, today millions of Americans have a split loyalty
between their commitment to the American nation and their commitment
to their country of origin, their ethnic group, or their local community or
state.
Aside from being impractical, one profound issue is almost always
ignored when the role of global governance is discussed or its future is
contemplated: democracy makes sense only when there is a community to
be governed. Just as we cannot expect a commuter bus to yield to majority
rule-the passengers voting to decide where the bus should travel-so
participating nation-states cannot be expected to submit to majority rulings
until and unless a much stronger global community exists. Being subject
to majority rule entails a willingness to make considerable sacrifices when
one loses out, not merely because one believes in the process but also
because it expresses the will of a community of which one is a member.
And it entails a significant measure of caring for the other members, a
sense of commitment not extended to nonmembers.
Charles Taylor, the communitarian philosopher, writes that "a modern
democratic state demands a 'people' with a strong collective identity.
Democracy obliges us to show much more solidarity and much more
commitment to one another in our joint political project than was
demanded by the hierarchical and authoritarian societies of yesteryear."56
Democracy, as the voice of a majority, tends to alienate subgroups, and it
fails to truly embody the will of all its citizens. If a state has no
community, if it is not enough of a nation, it is hard to introduce or sustain
democracy.
The same holds true many times over for groups of nations whose
shared bonds, cultures, and identities typically are insignificant compared
to those of the individual countries. It follows that representative global
govemance-in which the majority can impose policies on
minorities-can come about only once a global sense of community
56. Charles Taylor, Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?), in CITIZENsHIP, DIVERSITY,
AND PLURAuSM: CANADIAN AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 271 (Alan C. Cairns et al. eds.,
1999); see also Sunil Khilnani, Democracy and Modern Political Community: Limits and
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develops a great deal more. Communities are not merely places in which
people care about one another; they are also social bodies that share a
moral culture.57 Although the global community has a long way to go, the
reality is that its emergence presents the most promising way for preserving
security and the best prospect for a shared global culture.
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